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 The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate 
Change 
 
Elizabeth Fisher,* Eloise Scotford** and Emily Barritt*** 
Abstract: Climate change gives rise to disputes and problems that are not easily addressed by 
existing legal doctrines and frameworks. This is because: it is a polycentric problem; the 
assessment of future climate impacts must deal with uncertainty; climate change is socio-
politically controversial; and addressing climate change requires recognising a dynamic physical 
environment. As such, climate change can be thought of as legally disruptive in that it requires 
lawyers and legal scholars to reconcile the legal issues raised by climate change with existing legal 
orders. The legal disruption catalysed by climate change has not only led to the creation of new 
legal regimes but also given rise to a multitude of legal disputes that require adjudication. A study 
of some of these cases highlights the need for active and deliberate reflection about the nature of 
adjudication and the legal reasoning embedded in it when confronted by a disruptive phenomenon 
like climate change.    
Climate change now figures frequently in adjudication. Between 2013 and early 2015, there 
were over 394 cases in the UK, US, Australia and Canada in which a legal dispute related in 
some way to climate change.1 Unsurprisingly, much literature has been written on climate 
change in the courts: mapping climate change cases and considering how to define the scope 
                                                            
* Professor of Environmental Law, Faculty of Law and Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford. An earlier 
version of this article was presented at the Adjudicating the Future: Climate Change and the Rule of Law 
Symposium, London, 17-19 September 2015. The authors would like to thank attendees at that symposium and 
three anonymous reviewers for feedback on earlier versions of this article. Any omissions or errors remain our 
own. 
** Senior Lecturer, The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London. 
*** Teaching Fellow in Tort Law, The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London and Centre Fellow, 
Centre for Environment, Energy and Natural Resource Governance, University of Cambridge.  
1 We would like to thank Randall Stephenson for undertaking this case review for us. For other surveys of the 
case law see (n 2) below and the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-
change accessed 27 July 2015. 
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of such case law;2 examining litigation as a tool for forcing legal responses to climate 
change;3 exploring the role of courts in possible legal responses to climate change;4 and 
analysing specific cases.5 Much of this literature has treated courtrooms as another forum for 
politics. As a consequence, policy, commentary and debate tends to pivot around discussion 
of whether or not courts should act as such a forum.6 
The purpose of this article is different – it takes an ‘internal’ legal perspective7 and 
explores the way in which existing legal doctrines and frameworks are forced to confront, 
respond, and perhaps even evolve to respond to climate change, beyond the application and 
incremental development of existing rules and doctrines. In this regard, climate change may 
be thought of as legally disruptive in that it requires a ‘break’ in the continuity of existing 
legal practices and doctrinal ‘business as usual.’ Climate change is not the only problem that 
provokes legal disruption,8 but its highly polycentric, uncertain, socio-political charged and 
                                                            
2 David Markell and J.B. Ruhl, ‘An Emprical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New 
Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?’ (2012) 64 Florida L Rev 15; Jolene Lin, ‘Climate Change and the Courts’ 
(2012) 32 Legal Studies 35; Brian Preston, ‘Climate Change Governance: Policy and Litigation in a Multi-Level 
System Climate Change Litigation (Part 1)’ (2011) 1 Carbon and Climate Change Rev 3. 
3 Jacqueline Peel and Hari Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation: Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy (CUP 
2015); Richard Lord and others (eds), Climate Change Liability: Transnational Law and Practice (CUP 2012); 
Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, ‘“Six Honest Serving Men”: Climate Change Litigation as Legal Mobilisation and the 
Utility of Typologies’ (2010) 1 Climate L 31. 
4 Two recent high profile examples are: International Bar Association Presidential Task Force on Climate 
Change Justice and Human Rights, Acheiving Justice and Human Rights in An Era of Climate Disruption 
(International Bar Association 2014) and Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations, 
http://www.osloprinciples.org/ accessed 1 Nov 2015.  
5 For example the literature responding to Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency 549 US 497 
(2007). See Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Climate Change Litigation, Obsession and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly 
Response to Massachusetts v EPA’ (2013) 39 L And Policy 236. 
6 Compare Peel and Osofsky (n 3) with Lucas Bergkamp and Jaap Hanekamp, ‘Climate Change Litigation 
Against States: The Perils of court Made Climate Change Policies’ (2015) 24 European Energy and Env L Rev 
102. 
7 Although such an internal approach is a ‘highly flexible’ one: Chris McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the 
Social Sciences’ (2006) 122 LQR 632, 635. 
8 As Johns, Joyce and Pahuja point out in the international law context, ‘wars, forced migrations, environmental 
catastrophes, pandemic outbreaks, trade breakdowns, mass grave exhumations, technological breakthroughs: the 
international legal imaginary is littered with ruptive instances’: Fleur Johns, Richard Joyce and Sundhya Pahuja, 
‘Introduction’ in Fleur Johns, Richard Joyce and Sundhya Pahuja (eds) Events: The Force of International Law 
(Routledge 2011) 1. 
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dynamic nature presents particular challenges for legal orders and adjudication. These 
characteristics potentially place climate change in a different category of legal disruption, as 
the widespread legal challenges it presents reflect the fundamental upheaval of social and 
economic orders threatened by climate change. 
Most obviously, climate change causes legal disruption in that it has led to the 
creation of new legal regimes at all levels of government. However, climate change has also 
been highly disruptive of adjudicative processes and the article focuses on this form of 
disruption. Climate change is disruptive of adjudication in a variety of ways, including when 
courts are required to determine whether or not to decide a dispute; when the issues presented 
fit awkwardly into existing and well-honed grooves of legal reasoning; and when there are 
legal disputes about the nature and operation of bespoke climate change regimes. In all such 
cases, climate change requires lawyers and scholars to reconcile any legal disruption with the 
fundamental role that adjudication plays in maintaining the stability of legal orders. That 
process of reconciliation raises difficult and often nuanced questions about the legitimacy and 
limits of adjudication and about what amounts to robust legal reasoning.  
The structure of this article is as follows. Section One examines the legally disruptive 
nature of climate change and shows how adjudication is a key site where legal disruption 
generated by climate change manifests. Climate change leads to legal disruption because of 
its inherent nature and in particular because: the causes and impacts of climate change are 
polycentric; our scientific understanding of the future impacts of climate change has limits; 
climate change gives rise to socio-political conflict; and it requires the development of a legal 
regime that can deal with an unstable physical environment.  
Sections Two to Four provide examples of different forms of legal disruption 
occurring in adjudication. Section Two examines cases where the legal question before the 
court is essentially whether climate change should be legally recognised at all. Section Three 
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considers cases where climate change is legally recognised but where a court is faced with 
determining whether existing legal doctrines can be applied to a dispute concerning climate 
change, and if so how. These cases often involve the recrafting or rethinking of legal 
doctrine. Section Four examines cases where courts are dealing with disputes that arise in 
relation to climate change legislation and associated regulatory regimes. In these cases, courts 
often have to make legal sense of novel legal regimes and their obligations.  
In Section Five, we consider the consequences of our analysis. If climate change 
generates significant legal disruption of adjudicative processes, we argue that this requires 
scholars and lawyers to reflect on normative and existential challenges that this disruption 
poses for legal orders. We argue that questions about the practical and symbolic nature of 
adjudication and the role of legal reasoning in stabilising legal orders are fundamental in 
exploring these normative challenges. In Section Six, we conclude.  
Three points should be made before starting. First, to illustrate our argument, we draw 
on examples of cases from the US, UK, EU and some Commonwealth jurisdictions. This is 
not a comprehensive and/or rigorous comparative survey akin to the mapping exercises that 
can be seen in other scholarship.9 Our focus is on identifying the type of legal disruption 
caused by climate change not on classifying all climate change related case law or carrying 
out a comparative law analysis.  
Second, we define ‘adjudication’ in very broad terms to include triadic forms of 
dispute resolution, which involve some application of legal norms.10 With that said, 
understanding adjudication is ‘no easy task.’11 It is at once a deeply jurisprudential pursuit, a 
                                                            
9 For such a review, see the references in ns 1-4. 
10 This definition is adjusted from that of Shapiro’s in Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political 
Analysis (University of Chicago Press 1981) 1. 
11 Lon Fuller, ‘Adjudication and the Rule of Law’ (1960) 54 Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969) 1, 1. 
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socio-political consideration of the proper role of judges, and a practical question about the 
types of issues that can actually be resolved in a courtroom.12 Adjudication ‘presents itself in 
many mixed forms’ and, as a form of decision-making, it can blend into mediation and even 
representative government.13 It is also a collective practice. Adjudication is not the act of a 
single judge or a single party and its form and processes are embedded within the relevant 
legal, social and political culture. Thus, while our analysis is not strictly one of comparative 
law, we are acutely aware that understanding adjudication also requires an appreciation of 
how judging is done in different national and international contexts14.  
Third, we are not either for or against climate change adjudication. We take it as a 
given – 394 cases in 4 jurisdictions in less than 2 years says it all. What we are arguing for is 
the need for reflective, rigorous and creative discussion about the relationship between 
climate change and legal reasoning. A study of the types of legal issues that climate change is 
generating in adjudicative contexts is an important starting point for that discussion.   
1. The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change: A ‘Hot’ 
Situation   
Legal orders are expected to be stable and coherent. This expectation is expressed in many 
ways: the importance given to legal certainty and the rule of law; the operation of precedent 
in common law systems; the emphasis on legal formalism; the circumscribing of the judicial 
                                                            
12 Ibid 1. 
13 Ibid 2; Judith Resnik, ‘Reinventing Courts as Democratic Institutions’ (2014) 143 Daedalus 9. 
14 José Alvarez, International Organisations as Law-makers (OUP 2006) ch 9 (‘The Nature of International 
Adjudication’); Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale LJ 273. In particular, the common lawyer’s understanding is likely to be quite 
different from that of the civil lawyer and an American conception of adjudication will have a different 
emphasis to a British one: Susan Silbey, ‘The Courts in American Public Culture’ (2014) Daedalus 140; Resnik 
(n 13) 
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role; and the value placed on rigorous legal reasoning.15  As Latour has noted, ‘law has a 
homeostatic quality which is produced by the obligation to keep the fragile tissue of rules and 
texts intact’. As such, ‘a premium is put on legal stability’.16 Legal ‘innovations’ are thus 
more often than not presented as the ‘expression of a principle that was already in 
existence’.17  
 This is not to say the law does not evolve. There is also vigorous debate around the 
nature of the judicial role, the rule of law, legal certainty, precedent and what is good legal 
reasoning. However, in legal orders that subscribe to a version of the rule of law, it is 
generally seen as important that any law or legal dispute is resolved in a manner consistent 
with the workings of the rest of the legal order. In summing up the importance of legal 
stability, Waldron notes:  
Since law’s presence in people’s lives tends to be intrusive if not 
coercive, it is important that its presence be made calculable, so that it can 
enter into their planning. And since other people’s actions may also 
impact intrusively upon us, we need to know in advance how, and to what 
extent. These too will be controlled by law.18 
Again, the ‘calculability’ of law should not be understood in some naïve way as an 
expectation that law is always certain and unambiguous. However, in whatever way it is 
understood, climate change gives rise to situations that are at odds with legal stability, 
coherence and knowability. In this regard, climate change can be thought of as legally 
disruptive. As indicated above, we use the term ‘disruption’ to refer to the way in which the 
                                                            
15 There are many examples of these values being expressed but an excellent summary of the importance of 
legal stability can be found in Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin 2010) 37-40. 
16 Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil D'etat (Polity Press 2010) 242-3. 
17 ibid 219. 
18 Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Measure of Property (CUP 2012) 53. 
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legal issues arising from climate change cannot be addressed through the conventional 
application of legal doctrine. We argue that the legally disruptive nature of climate change is 
critical in making sense of the intellectual challenges that climate change presents to lawyers 
and legal scholars, just as other disruptive events pose significant challenges, and also 
opportunities, for legal and political orders.19  
 Our starting point is the fact that climate change20 is not a discrete solvable problem – 
many scholars describe it as a ‘wicked’ problem.21 As Hulme notes, wicked problems defy 
‘rational and optimal solutions’ and are ‘beyond the reach of mere technical knowledge and 
traditional forms of governance’.22 Given the negative connotations of the word ‘wicked’, we 
prefer Callon’s description of ‘hot’ situations in thinking about the complex dimensions of 
climate change as a problem.23 Situations are ‘hot’ when:  
everything becomes controversial: the identification of intermediaries and 
overflows, the distribution of source and target agents, the way effects are 
measured. These controversies which indicate the absence of a stabilised 
knowledge base, usually involve a wide variety of actors. The actual list 
of actors, as well as their identities will fluctuate in the course of a 
controversy itself and they put forward mutually incompatible 
descriptions of future world states.24 
                                                            
19 Johns, Joyce and Pahuja (n 8). 
20  For further details on the science of .climate change see the reports at http://www.ipcc.ch/ accessed 15 July 
2016. 
21 Chris Hilson, ‘It’s All About Climate Change, Stupid: Exploring the Relationship Between Environmental 
Law and Climate Law’ (2013) 25 JEL 359; Richard Lazarus, ‘Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: 
Restraining the Present to Liberature the Future’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 1153. 
22 Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Universtanding Controversy, Inaction and 
Opportunity (CUP 2009) 334. 
23 Michel Callon, ‘An Essay on Framing and Overflowing: Economic Externalities Revisited by Sociology’ in 
Michel Callon (ed), The Laws of the Markets (Blackwell 1998) and discussed in Elizabeth Fisher, 
‘Environmental Law as "Hot" Law’ (2013) 25 JEL 347. 
24  Callon (n 23) 260. 
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Inherent in this description is an expectation of what situations are normally (Callon 
describes such normal conditions as ‘cold’ situations). They are presumed to be manageable – 
the parties and interests at stake are identifiable and the facts ascertainable – so that 
understandings of rights and responsibilities can be applied in a rigorous way. In other words, 
normal situations are understood as being ‘calculable’ and law plays an important role in 
ensuring this.25 It defines the parties, the relationships between them, the duties they owe 
each other, what are the relevant facts, and so on.  
 In ‘hot’ situations, the role of law becomes more ‘hot’ itself, in that existing legal 
frameworks no longer easily manage legal situations. Either legal frameworks must evolve or 
new authoritative legal frames must be developed so as to accommodate the number and 
variety of parties and the relevant contested facts and politics.26 As Fisher notes, ‘hot’ law is 
not just controversial, but also raises issues which are ‘structural and foundational’.27 This is 
because there is difficulty in identifying the parties that are legally relevant and scientific 
uncertainty and socio-political conflict make it difficult to develop a robust factual base for 
decision-making and dispute resolution.28 
 Law is of course always evolving, and there are other examples of ‘hot’ situations that 
the law must deal with.29 But climate change poses significant and arguably unprecedented 
challenges for legal systems. There are a number of reasons why climate change is a ‘hot’ 
situation and thus leads to ‘hot’ law, but four interrelated features of climate change are 
particularly important to note, since they show why climate change raises particularly 
disruptive challenges for law and dispute resolution processes. The first ‘hot’ aspect of 
                                                            
25 Callon (n 23) 260. 
26 Fisher (n 23). 
27 Ibid 350. 
28 Ibid 350-1. 
29 Fisher (n 23). 
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climate change is that its causes and consequences are polycentric.30 The idea of legal 
problems being ‘polycentric’ is not new to lawyers,31 but the polycentric nature of climate 
change is a particularly extreme example of it. This is because anthropogenic climate change 
is caused by the cumulative and indirect impacts of human activities across a range of sectors, 
at various scales, across different countries. Its impacts are similarly indirect, multi-scalar and 
differentiated. For example, the emissions from a power station are the product of electricity 
production being used for a vast number of activities ranging from street lighting and home 
heating, to providing electricity to both local and multinational businesses. Likewise, the 
global nature of climate change requires engagement of governments and actors at a number 
of different levels.32 Addressing climate change involves a range of different actors in 
complex interrelationships with each other.33 All this means that climate change raises 
difficult and often novel questions about whose rights and interests should be taken into 
account in developing legal frameworks or in resolving a legal dispute.34 Who should have 
                                                            
30 For a discussion of polycentricity in environmental law, see Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange and Eloise 
Scotford, Environmental Law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP 2013) Ch 2. 
31 Abram Chayes, ‘The role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation’ (1976) 89 Harvard LR 1281; Bulga 
Milbrodale Progress Association Inc v Minister for Planning and Infrastructure and Warkworth Mining Limited 
[2013] NSWLEC 48; [31-43]; and Mott, R (on the application of) v Environment Agency [2016] EWCA Civ 
564, [75]. 
32 Joanne Scott, ‘The Multi-Level Governance of Climate Change’ in Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, The 
Evolution of EU Law (2nd ed, OUP 2011). 
33 Elinor Ostrom, ‘Polycentric Systems for Coping With Collective Action and Global Environmental Change’ 
(2010) 20 Global Environmental Change 550. 
34 Eg Harvard Climate Justice Coalition v President and Fellows of Harvard College 32 Mass L Rep 529 
(2015); Delta Construction Company Inc v EPA 783 F 3d 1291 (DC Cir 2015); Kanuk v State of Alaska 335 P 
3d 1088 (2014). 
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standing?35 Who should be accountable and for what and to whom?36  What is legally 
relevant?37  
Second, while scientific understandings of climate change are relatively settled, 
assessments of future climate change are not straightforward. This is important because the 
management of climate change is about controlling future impacts. As Stern has noted: 
It is almost as if the science of climate change has conspired to make the 
generation of action as difficult as possible. These difficulties arise from 
four key elements of the processes at work: (1) scale; (2) risk and 
uncertainty; (3) lags and delays in consequences; (4) the ‘publicness’ of 
greenhouse gas emissions - it is the total, global volume that matters, 
rather than an individual source.38 
Furthermore, polycentricity means the relationship between cause and effect cannot always 
be linked in a linear way. Risk, uncertainty, and the delays in consequences of the changing 
climate, mean that assessment is heavily dependent on computational modelling. Scientific 
uncertainty is inherent in the process of modelling and, while models are developed as 
rigorous representations of reality so as to gain insight, they are not ‘truth machines’.39  
                                                            
35 See Section 4 and Massachusetts (n 5); Texas v EPA 726 F3d 180 (DC Cir 2015); and Haughton v Minister 
for Planning and Macquarie Generation [2011] NSWLEC 217 (2 December 2011). 
36 Brown v Carlisle City Council [2014] EWHC 707 (Admin) (21 March 2014) [75] (aircraft emissions to be 
considered at the national level); Hunter Environment Lobby Inc v Minister for Planning [2011] NSWLEC 221 
(24 November 2011).  
37 See Section 5 and Kentucky Coal Assn Inc v Tennessee Valley Authority 68 F Supp 3d 703 (2015); WildEarth 
Guardians v EPA 751 F3d 649 (DC Cir 2014); Hunter Environment Lobby (n 36) [33]. 
38 Nicholas Stern, Why are We Waiting?: The Logic, Urgency, and Promise of Tackling Climate Change (MIT 
Press 2015) 4. 
39 Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher and Pasky Pascual, ‘Misunderstanding Models in Environmental and Public 
Health Regulation’ (2010) 18 New York U Env LJ 101. 
Climate Change and Legal Disruption         11 
 
The need to make legal decisions in circumstances of scientific uncertainty creates 
fundamental challenges for law and adjudicative processes, particularly because of the value 
placed on legal stability in applying legal rules and in resolving disputes. As Latour notes:  
Science can tolerate gaps, but the law has to be seamless. Science can 
draw on lively controversy but the law has to restore an equilibrium. 
Although one might speak admiringly of ‘revolutionary science’, 
‘revolutionary laws’ have always been as terrifying as courts with 
emergency powers.40  
Much legal doctrine and procedure operates on the basis that facts are ascertainable, or at 
least can be agreed upon through application of the rules of evidence. Computer modelling 
and other techniques are other forms of developing a robust understanding of the world.41 
These techniques not only raise the issue of how law understands what is an acceptable 
evidentiary basis for action,42 but also how such decisions should be legally held to account – 
the latter question of public law is one that government and courts alike have struggled 
with.43 There are also questions about how to attribute legal responsibility in such uncertain 
and polycentric contexts. 44 
The third ‘hot’ feature of climate change to note is that debates over climate change 
inherently involve conflicts about how communities wish to live and how losses and benefits 
are distributed in a society.45 Issues of fairness in society are inherent in all law and legal 
                                                            
40 Latour (n 16) 243. 
41 Wagner, Fisher and Pascual (n 39). 
42 Eg In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation 709 F 3d 1 (DC Cir 2013). 
43 Elizabeth Fisher, Pasky Pascual and Wendy Wagner, ‘Rethinking Judicial Review of Expert Agencies’ (2015) 
93 Texas L Rev 1681.  
44 See the discussion in relation to standing in Massachusetts (n 5) and Delta Construction (n 34). For a general 
discussion, see Douglas Kysar, ‘What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law’ (2011) 41 Env L 1. 
45 There are countless examples of this, including the ongoing and seemingly intractable negotiations of the 
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (see http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/6237.php?filtbody=53), or differing 
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practice, but developing a coherent understanding of our ideal future society in circumstances 
of polycentricity and uncertainty makes this a particularly challenging exercise. Given the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ character of climate change, such decision-making inevitably 
involves a role for the state and its role in promoting a particular vision of the good life.46 As 
Steve Rayner has noted, ‘[c]limate change is not so much a discrete problem to be solved as it 
is a condition under which human beings will have to make choices about such matters as 
priorities for economic development and the way we govern ourselves’.47 An obvious 
disruptive question from a legal perspective is whether disputes over climate change are 
socio-political disputes (and thus to be resolved in political forums) more than legal disputes. 
If they are, then responsibility for climate change is non-justiciable, and disputes over it are 
not for resolution in judicial forums.48  
Finally, it is important to note that the earth’s climate can no longer be taken as a 
‘given’.49 As the physical state of the world is in flux, this has implications for legal, political 
and social frameworks that have rested on assumptions of stability.50 In light of climate 
change, ‘the assumption of an unchanging natural world clearly does not hold today and it 
will be even further from reality in the future’.51 Sea level rise, flooding and drought are 
problems because they are physical conditions that affect our expectations of what it means to 
live in the world and what we can expect from it, particularly in terms of legal rights. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
views on major airport expansion (see the recent UK Airports Commission Final Report at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/airports-commission-releases-final-report vs the protests of Plane Stupid 
at http://www.planestupid.com/). 
46 Ostrom (n 33). 
47 Steve Rayner, ‘Foreword’ in Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding 
Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity (CUP 2009) xxii. 
48 Eg Kanuk (n 34) 1096. 
49 Daniel Farber, Property Rights and Climate Change (Wolf Family Lecture on American Law, University of 
Florida Levein College of Law 2014) 2. 
50 F Lawson and B Rudden, The Law of Property (Clarendon Press 2002) 3-4. 
51 Farber (n 49) 3. 
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Variation in climate is not new, but anthropocentric climate change brings with it changes 
outside the normal range of variation. The dynamic nature of climate change does not sit 
easily with legal orders that value stability and legal certainty. This arises because, if 
dynamism is taken seriously in disputes that involve environmental ‘facts’, then legal 
frameworks and obligations will need to change in light of the changing climate. This raises 
directly the issue of how to reconcile change and legal certainty, particularly in areas such as 
property law where there is an expectation that law will ensure stable relations.52 
 The above discussion makes clear that taking climate change seriously presents a 
series of conundrums for lawyers and legal scholars. Whilst it is obvious that climate change 
does not fit easily into legal frameworks developed for more manageable states of affairs – 
Callon’s ‘cold’ situations – it is not obvious what types of legal norms should evolve to 
accommodate the causes and consequences of climate change. Should, for example, new 
forms of obligation, responsibility and causation be developed? Or should we persist with our 
existing norms and the values they perpetuate? These questions are not just discrete questions 
for those lawyers having to think about climate change, but they invoke questions about legal 
stability more broadly. In this sense, climate change is legally disruptive. These kinds of 
disruptive normative challenges arise in two main ways across legal orders – through the 
development of new and novel legislative and regulatory responses to climate change, and 
through the adjudicative challenges generated when climate change, inevitably, gives rise to 
legal disputes.   
The most obvious aspect of the legally disruptive nature of climate change is that it is 
seen as a ‘new’ problem that has resulted in new international law agreements, new national 
legislation, and new regulatory regimes concerned with addressing both the causes and 
                                                            
52 Regulating dynamic environmental problems is already challenging conventional notions of property rights, at 
least in English law: see Eloise Scotford and Rachael Walsh,’ ‘The Symbiosis of Property and English 
Environmental Law – Property Rights in a Public Law Context’ (2013) 76 MLR 1010. 
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impacts of climate change. The most high profile of these is the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC),53 but there are many examples of national initiatives, often 
catalysed by the UNFCCC. Up until 2014, there were nearly 400 legislative measures passed 
in 99 countries, accompanied by over 400 policies created by the executive branches of 
governments.54 These include bespoke statutes,55 regulatory frameworks,56 and ‘soft’ laws in 
the form of policies.57 These laws regulate many things including emission limits,58 emissions 
trading schemes,59 building standards,60 transport strategies,61 and vegetation clearance 
schemes.62 Inherent in these legal responses are a variety of strategies, including prevention, 
mitigation, and adaption.63 Alongside these national measures are many initiatives by 
regional and local governments.64  
                                                            
53 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, ratified 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 
107. 
54 Michal Nachmany and others, The 2015 Global Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change 
Legislation in 99 Countries Summary for Policy-makers (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and 
the Environment 2015) 12. Also see the publications at Globe International: <http://globelegislators.org> 
accessed 15 July 2016. 
55 Eg Climate Change Response Act (2002) (New Zealand); Climate Change Response Act (2002) (Philippines); 
Climate Change Act 2008 (UK); Climate Change Mitigation Act (2014) (Bulgaria); Climate Change Act (2014) 
(Denmark); Climate Change Act (2014) (Finland)..  
56  Eg Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32 (as amended). 
57 Eg National Climate Change Adaptation Framework (2012) (Ireland); National Action Plan on Climate 
Change (2008) (India); National Adaptation Plan to Climate Change (2006) (Spain); National Climate Change 
Strategy (2012) (Singapore). 
58 Climate Change Act 2008 (UK). 
59 Eg Directive 2003/87/EC (n 56) and Climate Change Response Act (2002) (New Zealand). 
60  Buildings Performance Institute Europe, Europe’s Buildings Under the Microscope: A Country by Country 
Review of the Energy Efficiency of Buildings (2011), Pt 2 < 
http://www.europeanclimate.org/documents/LR_%20CbC_study.pdf> accessed 15 July 2016. 
61 Eg http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/index_en.htm accessed 15 July 2016. 
62 Eg Native Vegetation Act 2003 (NSW).  
63  On the distinction, see WG II (Impacts, Adaption, and Vulnerability) and WG III (Mitigation of Climate 
Change) of the IPCC reports (n 20). 
64  Michele Finck, ‘Above and Below the Surface: The Status of Sub-National Authorities in EU Climate 
Change Regulation’ (2014) 26 JEL 443. 
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Some of these regimes may involve the application of pre-existing legal obligations 
and concepts to the ‘new’ problem of climate change. In other cases, new legal obligations, 
responsibilities, forms of accountability and/or remedies are being created. Thus the 
UNFCCC regime since the Paris Agreement is becoming more hybrid and multi-level in its 
legal architecture and less centred on a set of international rules formulated in a single 
treaty.65 Climate change legislation creates legal duties that extend into the future.66 Emission 
trading schemes transform emissions into legal units that can be traded.67  
As we shall see below, these ‘novel’ obligations can and do give rise to legal 
disruption. But legal disruption does not stop there. The legally disruptive nature of climate 
change is also reflected in the fact that climate change generates disputes, and in particular 
legal disputes. The case law concerning climate change and climate change related issues is 
extensive, and defining a ‘climate change case’ is difficult.68 Legal disputes that can be 
identified as relating to climate change in some way can arise among a range of different 
actors and litigation is brought for a range of reasons. Some litigants may have political 
motivations,69 but many actors (even those motivated by politics) are looking for some form 
of legal ordering in light of climate change – some are ideologically opportunistic, some are 
trying to reduce legal uncertainty, some feel a keen sense of injustice and some are simply 
needing a legal dispute resolved.  
                                                            
65 Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The Devilish Details: Key Legal issues in the 2015 Climate Negotiations’ (2015) 78 
MLR 826. 
66 Climate Change Act 2008 (UK) s 1. 
67 On how these are disruptive of legal understandings of property, see Kelvin Low and Jolene Lin, Carbon 
Credits as EU Like It: Property, Immunity, TragiCO2medy?’ (2015) 3 JEL 377. 
68 For a thoughtful analysis of this problem, see J B Ruhl, ‘What is Climate Change Law?’ OUP Blog, 22 
August 2015, < http://blog.oup.com/2015/08/what-is-climate-change-law/> accessed 15 July 2016. 
69 These motivations will vary considerably. Compare Urgenda Foundation v Netherlands (24 June 2015) 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 < 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196>  accessed 15 July 2016 and 
Spencer v The Commonwealth [2015] FCA 754 (24 July 2015). 
Climate Change and Legal Disruption         16 
 
Most legal disputes relating to climate change are in courts of first instance. There are 
also a significant number in other dispute resolution forums. Further, the legal issues that 
arise in these cases vary widely. Some of these legal disputes involving climate change are 
straightforward in a legal sense. Markell & Ruhl have noted the substantive legal question in 
Massachusetts v EPA70 was a ‘vanilla’ statutory interpretation’ one.71 However, many 
disputes require judges to reflect on the nature and scope of existing doctrine. Thus 
Massachusetts v EPA also involved an unusual standing issue,72 and in other cases the 
questions of statutory interpretation are not so straightforward.73 In other cases, the issues 
presented are entirely novel.  
In nearly all these disputes, however, courts are faced with the legal disruption created 
by climate change. In particular, they are faced with the challenge of trying to determine 
whether the issues raised by climate change are capable of legal resolution and if so how. In 
navigating these disruptive issues, judges and adjudicators must employ processes of legal 
reasoning. Cases are not ‘to be decided by naturall reason but by the artificiall reason and 
judgment of Law, .... which requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain 
to the cognizance of it’.74 The challenge for courts is to reconcile such expert and ingrained 
processes of reasoning with the disruptive challenge of climate change so that legal orders 
remain stable and evolve in as robust and coherent a way as possible.   
The next three sections demonstrate this point by analysing the legal disruption 
caused by climate change in three different forms. Section Two examines cases that deal with 
                                                            
70  Massachusetts (n 5). 
71 Markell and Ruhl (n 2) 69. 
72 See for example Massachusetts (n 5). 
73 Utility Air Regulatory Group v EPA 134 S Ct 2427 (2014). 
74 Coke as quoted in Lord Mance, ‘Should the Law be Certain?’ Oxford Shrieval Lecture (11th October 2011), 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_111011.pdf accessed 15 July 2016. 
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the question of whether climate change should be legally recognised at all. Section Three 
considers cases where climate change is legally recognised, but there is a need to determine 
how legal doctrine should be recrafted in light of climate change. Finally, Section Four 
examines legal disputes that are arising in relation to specific climate change regimes. These 
categories overlap (and a single case may raise issues in all three categories) but we use this 
structure to show the pervasive nature of the legal disruption caused by climate change.   
2. Jurisdiction and Justiciability: ‘Opening the Door to 
Everything’? 
Our first category of cases illustrating the legal disruption generated by climate change is 
comprised of ‘threshold’ cases. In these cases, courts and tribunals must consider whether 
law can and should recognize climate change as a problem and develop an adjudicative 
response to it when there are no existing legal obligations to do so. These issues usually 
manifest themselves as preliminary questions about a court or tribunal’s jurisdiction, asking 
whether there is a ‘case’ or ‘dispute’ that a court can hear.75 These disputes are legally 
disruptive in that they involve jurisdictional issues that are unusual or contentious for courts. 
The question for the court is whether by considering a novel question it will ‘open the door to 
everything’ and ‘everything will be in flux’ so that law becomes ‘unstable, slippery and 
shaken’.76 Crudely, this might be thought of as a floodgates argument, but it also directly 
relates to a desire for maintaining established legal stability and coherence.  
As indicated above, climate change issues come before the courts in disparate and 
often novel ways and thus initial questions relating to jurisdiction are multifaceted and arise 
in unpredictable cases. These questions arise in the context of specific legislation that address 
                                                            
75 Massachusetts (n 5) 516. 
76 Latour (n 16) 179, 178. 
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climate change,77 the judicial review of policy decisions,78 tort claims against major energy 
producers79 and even employment cases.80 Questions of justiciability, jurisdiction and 
competence are also framed differently in different courts or tribunals. In some legal cultures, 
domestic doctrines of justiciability are challenged by climate change when cases are brought 
for instrumental and campaigning reasons.81 Section One examined how climate change often 
engages deeply political questions concerning economic policy and international relations 
and, for this reason, courts can be unwilling to engage with such issues as they are cautious 
about their constitutional competence.82  
In Friends of the Earth v Minister of the Environment and Governor in Council,83 for 
example, the Canadian Federal Court were asked, by way of judicial review, to compel the 
government to take more effective measures to combat climate change and to comply with 
the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act 2007. The court concluded the issues before them 
were non-justiciable. This decision reflects, perhaps in a particularly strong form, the Anglo-
American tradition of courts granting a broad discretion to public decision makers in matters 
of nationally significant public policy.84 This is not to say that cases brought against 
governments seeking to compel action relating to climate change will always be non-
                                                            
77 Massachusetts (n 5); Friends of the Earth Canada v Minister of the Environment and Governor in Council (n 
83). 
78 R (People and Planet) v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 3020; R (Dimmock) v Secretary of State for Education 
and Skills [2008] 1 All ER 367. 
79 Native Village of Kivalina v Exxonmobil Corporation 663 F Supp 2d 863 (ND Cal 2009); American Electric 
Power Company v Connecticut 131 S Ct 2527 (2011). 
80 Grainger PLC & Others v Nicholson UKEAT/-219/07/ZT. 
81 See also Kanuk (n 34). 
82 Although it is not always the case that judges are constitutionally conscious when adjudicating the socio-
political dimensions of climate change. See in particular the reasoning in the merits review tribunal case of 
Koppenol P in Re Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty Ltd & Ors [2007] QLRT 33 at [23]. 
83 Friends of the Earth v Minister of the Environment and Governor in Council [2009] 3 FCR 201. 
84 R v Secretary of State for the Environment; ex p Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1991] 1 AC 521.   
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justiciable.85 Much depends on the legal culture involved, the policies that might have been 
adopted or representations made by a particular government, and the legal significance of the 
international law framework relating to climate change within a jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, questions of jurisdiction concerning climate change do not always 
present themselves directly. In some jurisdictions, disputes may end up in forums in which 
there is no judicial expertise for dealing with a claim that raises climate change issues.86 In 
the US, federal common law claims can be displaced by statutory provisions.87 And, in some 
international adjudicative forums, a failure to exhaust domestic remedies can be a bar to 
jurisdiction.88 An example of another kind of jurisdictional or competence limitation is seen 
in R (People and Planet) v HM Treasury, where English judicial review doctrine was applied 
so that climate change issues were not amenable to judicial reconsideration.  Climate change 
concerns were to be weighed by government alone in making its investment decisions.89  This 
case involved a challenge to HM Treasury’s policy in relation to UK Financial Investments 
Ltd, a company owned by HM Treasury, which at the time owned 70% of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS). The applicant’s claimed that HM Treasury’s investment policy in relation to 
its RBS investment should have been more alive to adverse climate change impacts. Amongst 
other reasons for dismissing the claim, Mr Justice Sales (as he then was) held that the 
applicant’s claim was too legally prescriptive and failed to respect the policy discretion 
involved in this government investment.  
                                                            
85 See Urgenda (n 69). 
86 For example Koppenol P engaged in an analysis of the scientific evidence surrounding climate change, 
displaying a lack of understanding of the technical information before him: Re Xstrata Coal Queensland (n 82) 
[15]-[20]. 
87 Kivalina (n 79) and American Electric Power Company (n 79). 
88 For example, Article 31 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Rules of Procedure requires a 
petitioner to exhaust domestic remedies before submitting a case to its jurisdiction. 
89 People and Planet (n 78). 
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The doctrine of standing is also legally disrupted by climate change. In most 
countries, standing doctrines have historically required litigants to show that their private 
interests have been directly affected, whether in private or public law claims.90 While those 
doctrines have been liberalised for administrative law claims in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions, particularly in the environmental context,91 the indirect, intergenerational and 
community-wide nature of climate change means that the standing of litigants where they are 
raising climate change issues does not easily sit with many forms of standing doctrine.  Thus 
while ‘public interest’ standing is recognised in these legal cultures, a number of legal 
disputes involving climate change do not fit even within those more liberalised regimes and 
give rise to different legal questions about the nature of legal standing. This is not only in 
cases brought by public interest groups, but also in relation to industry actors wishing to 
challenge climate change action.92 This highlights the fact that problems of standing are not 
caused by a political choice but rather by a mismatch between the understandings of 
legitimate interests in a legal system and the type of interests that are entangled in, and thus 
affected by, climate change.93  Climate change thus raises disruptive legal questions. 
A notable instance where a court found that an applicant in a climate change case did 
not have standing is Native Village of Kivalina v Exxonmobil Corporation.94 In this case, the 
City of Kivalina, situated on the northwest coast of Alaska, brought a claim in public 
nuisance against numerous corporate producers of greenhouse gas emissions for damage 
                                                            
90 Peter Cane ‘Open Standing and the Role of the Courts in a Democratic Society’ (1999) 20 Singapore L Rev 
23. 
91 Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44 and Sierra Club v Morton 405 US 727 (1972).   
92 Eg Delta Construction Company (n 34) and Carbon Sequestration Council v Environmental Protection 
Agency 787 F 3d 1129 (DC Cir 2015). 
93 Peter Cane, ‘Open Standing and the Role of Courts in a Democratic Society’ (1999) 20 Singapore L Rev 23. 
94 Native Village of Kivalina (n 79) The result in this case was surprising because Kivalina was a government 
claimant, as in Massachusetts (n 5), the consequences of coastal erosion for the City of Kivalina were incredibly 
serious, requiring the population to relocate and, as Douglas Kysar argues, they were an ‘extremely 
sympathetic’ claimant: Kysar (n 44) 27-28. 
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caused by erosion of the city’s coastline. The District Court found that Kivalina lacked 
standing because it could demonstrate neither a ‘substantial likelihood’ that the defendants 
were responsible for Kivalina’s injuries, nor that they produced the ‘seed’ of those injuries. 
The Court of Appeal, although the case on appeal was focused on displacement and not 
standing, added that Kivalina were not able to ‘pick and choose amongst all the greenhouse 
gas emitters throughout history’ in bringing their claim.95 The reasoning in Kivalina, and in 
cases like it,96 shows that the relevant issue is not whether the test for standing is too narrow 
to allow for such claims,97 but that the ‘peculiar form of presentation’ afforded to affected 
parties in adjudicative processes is ill-fitting in cases involving climate change issues.98 The 
failure of claimants’ claims to standing in these cases represents a disruptive challenge for a 
legal order in recognising climate change as a legal problem.  
The nature and complexity of this challenge is more fully seen when a court does 
legally recognise climate change.  There are thus cases in which the legal approach is 
different and a climate change-related dispute is found to be justiciable or its litigants are 
found to have standing. An example of the latter case is seen in Massachusetts v EPA.99 
While the statutory interpretation question in the case may have been straightforward, the 
question of whether the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had standing was not.100 It 
involved states petitioning the Federal government to take action. In applying the legal test 
for standing under Art III of the US Constitution – the ‘injury in fact’ test – the Court was 
                                                            
95 Ibid 1676. 
96  American Electric Power Company (n 79); Washington Environmental Council v Bellon (9th Cir. No. 12-
35323, Oct. 17, 2013).  
97 Massachusetts (n 5). 
98 Section 3.  
99 (n 5). 
100 Amy Wildermouth, ‘Why State Standing in Massachusetts v EPA Matters’ (2007) 27 J of Land, Resources 
and Environmental L 273, 274.  
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also accommodating climate change and incorporating it into the legal order. Justice Stevens 
for the majority stated:  
 EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a 
risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent.’ …… 
There is, moreover, a ‘substantial likelihood that the judicial relief 
requested’ will prompt EPA to take steps to reduce that risk.101 
The problem for the court was not a classic ‘public interest’ standing issue, but concerned 
whether there was a legal controversy to be adjudicated upon. This legal issue arose because 
of the polycentric nature of climate change and the way in which it required an assessment of 
uncertain future impacts.  
 Another example of climate change being legally recognised through reasoning 
involving a doctrine of standing is seen in the decision in Urgenda v Netherlands.102  This 
case provides a rich seam of legal reasoning in thinking about climate change and legal 
disruption, and is also considered in Sections Three and Four below. It is notable here for the 
civil procedure argument between the parties over whether Urgenda as an NGO had standing 
to bring the claim at all.  The Netherlands government argued that Urgenda could not have 
standing in this matter as it effectively represented future generations and those living outside 
the Netherlands in seeking orders to require the Dutch government to introduce a more 
stringent climate change policy.103 The court however interpreted the relevant rules of legal 
standing that apply to NGOs so as to include Urgenda, both applying the relevant technical 
requirements and recognising that Urgenda’s remit as an NGO – striving for a more 
sustainable society ‘beginning in the Netherlands’ – inherently involves some international 
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102Urgenda (n 69).  
103  Ibid [4.5]-[4.8]. 
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and future dimensions.  This reasoning was a new step for the court in applying Dutch 
standing rules, which took into account the complex nature of the climate change problem at 
the core of the dispute.  
In relation to questions of justiciability, courts have also shown that they can 
recognise climate change as a legal problem. Thus, in Connecticut v American Electric 
Power a public nuisance action was brought by eight states, the City of New York and three 
land trusts, seeking to cap-and-abate the defendants’ GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions in 
light of their ongoing contribution to global warming.104 The Second Circuit court found that 
the complexity of the case was no reason to find it non-justiciable,105 reasoning that ‘federal 
courts have successfully adjudicated complex common law public nuisance cases for over a 
century’.106 The court cited a number of examples where federal courts have displayed a 
‘masterful handling’ of complex issues in order to both resolve complex disputes and develop 
standards.107 They also acknowledged that although there were policy aspects to the case, 
they had not been asked to adjudicate on them. The socio-political dimensions did not 
constitute an automatic bar to them adjudicating upon the legal questions of public nuisance 
raised. By acknowledging the disruptive aspects of the case, the court indicated that courts 
have an important role to play in addressing legal challenges that engage climate change 
issues.   
The cases in this section reveal that there is no one dominant legal response to climate 
change cases when they appear before courts or tribunals, partly because they present in 
many different causes of actions and forums. Rather, climate change often presents a 
                                                            
104 Connecticut v American Electric Power Co 582 F.3d 309, 332 (2d Cir. 2009). 
105 This was in contradiction to the District Court which had found that the claim was non-justiciable: 
Connecticut v American Electric Power Co Inc et al, (SNDY 2005) No 04 civ 5669 LAP. On appeal to the 
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disruptive challenge to courts and tribunals in recognising cases or litigants within their 
jurisdictions and legal traditions. It is not a case of whether courts should say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to 
hearing climate change cases, but how they can make legal sense of climate change as a 
problem when relevant disputes appear before them. This problem does not go away once a 
climate change is legally recognised by courts, as the next Section shows. 
3. Developing Responses to Climate Change: Legal Disruption 
through Challenging and Recrafting Doctrine 
Even if climate change is recognized as an issue that is subject to legal adjudication within a 
legal forum, it still presents a series of disruptive legal issues as courts and legal decision-
makers are drawn into responding to it. Depending on the type of legal claim involved, a 
cascade of legal questions can appear – about valid statutory interpretation,108 about the 
control of discretion,109 about procedural fairness,110 about liability, and about state 
responsibility.111 In the context of climate change, these questions are often not easy to 
answer. Whilst, in most legal cultures, existing legal rules and doctrine provide a relatively 
stable framework for regulating behaviour and ordering relations between people, or between 
people and the state, this framework needs to become malleable in the face of a changing 
environment under the stress of a polycentric problem like climate change. The challenge is 
reconciling that malleability with the expectation that the ‘fabric of the law has to cover 
                                                            
108 Utility Air Group (n 73).  
109 Minister for Planning v Walker [2008] NSWCA 224 
110  Warkworth Mining Limited v Bulga Milbrodale Progress Association Inc [2014] NSWCA 105. 
111 Urgenda (n 69) 
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everything completely and seamlessly’.112 As such, ‘a judge has to ensure that holes are 
repaired immediately, that tears are darned without delay, gaps filled and cases resolved’.113 
But how malleable should legal doctrine be? Consider, as an example, the US 
Supreme Court of Utility Air Regulatory Group v EPA.114 This case concerned a challenge to 
the regulatory action the EPA had taken under the Clean Air Act after to the ruling in 
Massachusetts v EPA.115 The question in this case was not the type of dichotomous question 
seen in the last section – should climate change be legally recognised or not? Rather the 
question was, given the problem of climate change, how should the powers of the EPA be 
interpreted under the Clean Air Act? The answer was a mixed one – the majority found that 
the EPA could not interpret the Act to regulate non-major sources, and the minority adopted a 
different perspective. As Jasanoff notes, the reasoning ‘turned on a concern with the right 
forms and limits of legal interpretation’.116 The case shows the difficulty of accommodating 
the polycentric causes of emissions under the Clean Air Act.117   
Two trends in judicial reasoning in relation to the malleability of legal doctrine in the 
face of climate change can be identified: cases where existing doctrine remains awkward for 
courts to apply, and cases where doctrine evolves to accommodate the ‘hot’ nature of climate 
change. In both situations, the disruptive features of climate change mean that climate 
change-related disputes do not fit easily into existing doctrinal paradigms. 
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In the first type of case, there are no problems with courts or judges acknowledging 
the problem or facts of climate change, but legal doctrines and procedures are difficult to 
apply in resolving claims relating to climate change.  An interesting example can be seen in 
the Dutch District Court decision Urgenda v Netherlands, discussed above, where the Court 
noted:   
The question whether the State is in breach of its duty of care for taking 
insufficient measures to prevent dangerous climate change, is a legal 
issue which has never before been answered in Dutch proceedings and for 
which jurisprudence does not provide a ready-made framework.118 
Whilst this case was a symbolic ‘win’ for ‘climate change litigation’, as discussed below, the 
causes of action that did not succeed in this case are noteworthy. In particular, the claims 
based on Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) failed due 
to the fact that the Urgenda Foundation bringing the case – a non-governmental organization 
with a sustainability agenda – could not be designated as a ‘direct or indirect victim’ within 
the meaning of Article 34 ECHR.  This was a case in which the court very much 
acknowledged the nature of the climate change problem, but did not find that there were 
breaches of ECHR rights in respect of a claimant such as Urgenda that had no personal rights 
to be infringed.  In ECHR doctrine, Urgenda was not the right kind of claimant to defend the 
human rights of those (including those unborn) affected by the impacts of climate change.  
Whilst this might appear an unremarkable application of a legal doctrine to a set of facts, the 
implication is that there might be no appropriate claimant to vindicate the rights of groups of 
people affected by climate change, particularly those of future generations.  Climate change 
has widely dispersed social impacts and so does not fit easily into the individualised legal 
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paradigm of human rights.  This is a classic example of legal disruption generated by climate 
change. 
Other (hypothetical) cases in which existing doctrines seem mismatched to the ‘hot’ 
aspects of climate change include those of tort law. As Douglas Kysar explains:119 
Built as it is on a paradigm of harm in which A wrongfully, directly, and 
exclusively injures B, tort law seems fundamentally ill-equipped to 
address the causes and impacts of climate change: diffuse and disparate in 
origin, lagged and latticed in effect, anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions represent the paradigmatic anti-tort, a collective action problem 
so pervasive and so complicated as to render at once both all of us and 
none of us responsible. Thus, courts will have ample reason—not to 
mention doctrinal weaponry—to prevent climate change tort suits from 
reaching a jury [or courtroom in non-US tort cases]. 
However, as Kysar himself acknowledges, tort law could apply to climate change problems, 
to find for example that heavy industrial emitters of GHGs owe a collective duty of care to 
remote and unknown victims of climate change, who are ‘neighbours’ in an interconnected, 
ecological sense. Whilst the dominant doctrinal paradigm of tort law seems inapplicable in 
such a case alleged civil liability for climate change impacts, climate change is legally 
disruptive and tort law could yet evolve.120   
In other cases, however, courts are developing new legal principles within particular 
legal orders, engaging in processes of doctrinal evolution that accommodate the ‘hot’ nature 
of climate change. There are various examples of cases in which courts have rethought and 
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developed legal doctrine in climate change cases, lending their authority to controversial 
disputes involving climate change.  These cases do not involve a single type of legal claim – 
they involve both private and public law doctrine – and they come from different 
jurisdictions. In these cases, judges have developed legal reasoning by taking into account the 
policy and legal background relating to climate change, both domestically and 
internationally, so as to justify, or as part of, their development of doctrine.   
In Urgenda, this type of doctrinal evolution can be seen in the way that the Court 
relies on international, EU and Dutch law and policy relating to climate change,121 
mainstream climate science and ECHR case law to develop the Dutch legal doctrine of 
‘hazardous state negligence’ so that it applied in the case.  The Court thus held the Dutch 
government to a high standard of care in protecting its citizens from the dangerous and life-
threatening consequences of climate change and as a result required the government to curb 
its greenhouse gas emissions more quickly than its current policies were aiming for. This was 
a stunning legal result – not just as a perceived victory for climate justice,122 but also for its 
progressive legal reasoning and development of Dutch legal doctrine. The court took the 
absence of an applicable legal framework as an opportunity to generate one, and there are 
many aspects of the decision that involve an ambitious evolution of doctrine in the face of 
climate change, including in relation to causation123 and questions of constitutional law.124  
                                                            
121 And the principles on which this policy is based, including the precautionary, prevention and sustainability 
principles: [4.56]-[4.63]. 
122 See the following news stories in response: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/24/dutch-
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By this reasoning, the Court showed how the legally disruptive nature of climate change can 
lead to new (and in this case politically controversial and highly symbolic) legal doctrine.   
Another case in which courts have recognized climate change policy in the 
application and evolution of climate change doctrine is the decision of the New South Wales 
Land and Environment Court in Taralga Landscape Guardians v Minister for Planning.125  
This was a merits review administrative appeal against a planning decision to allow the 
construction of a wind farm. Legally, this is an equally interesting case where the court feels 
compelled to take into account pressing climate change policy to inform its administrative 
law doctrine and allow the construction of the wind farm in this case.  A central feature of the 
court’s reasoning was the principle of intergenerational equity, the doctrinal relevance of 
which Chief Judge Preston explained thus: ‘[the] principles of sustainable development are 
central to any decision-making process concerning the development of new energy 
resources’.126  This reasoning represents a gradual evolution of doctrine in the NSW Land 
and Environment Court, in which the ‘principles of ecologically sustainable development’ 
have become ever more central in the Court’s reasoning across all aspects of its 
jurisdiction.127 This doctrinal evolution in Taralga is particularly sparked by the climate 
change context.  Preston CJ discussed various policy developments and papers on climate 
change and wind energy to conclude that the ‘broader public good of increasing the supply of 
renewable energy’ justified granting planning approval for the scheme under consideration.128  
This was because renewable energy would serve to promote intergenerational equity in the 
context of energy production, by minimizing use of GHG-producing fossil fuel resources to 
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generate energy and ‘thereby reducing the cumulative and long-term effects caused by 
anthropogenic climate change’.129 
Both these cases – Urgenda and Taralga – are dramatic in their legal developments 
and also in terms of their policy implications for climate change.  There are other cases that 
have had similar impacts due to their legal innovation and controversial political 
implications.130 No doubt more such cases will follow in which legal evolution follows 
disruptive developments in climate change policy.  In some cases, it can even be said that 
courts have not so much developed legal doctrine but distorted it to comply with compelling 
climate change goals.131   
4. Legal Disruption and Climate Change Regulatory Regimes  
Our final category of legal disruption is that caused by regulatory schemes and legislative 
frameworks that have been created to address both the causes and the impacts of climate 
change. Such regimes, and their legally disruptive effects, can be found across jurisdictions.  
The most high profile examples are emission-trading schemes (ETSs),132 but a variety of 
other regimes exist and include: regimes that promote non-carbon based electricity;133 
                                                            
129 Ibid [74]. 
130 Eg R (London Borough of Hillingdon) v Secretary of State for Transport [2010] EWHC 626 (Admin) 
(judicial review of the previously aborted UK government plans to expand Heathrow Airport, involving the 
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L283/33. 
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schemes that ensure energy efficiency;134 legislation creating obligations for climate 
change;135 and a variety of regimes concerned with adapting to climate change, particularly in 
the planning context.136 Whilst these frameworks aim to address climate change as a problem, 
their operation requires them to deal with the ‘hot’ situation of climate change. 
Polycentricity, scientific uncertainty and normative conflict do not disappear with a 
regulatory ‘solution’ for climate change but need to be accommodated within a legal culture, 
including through the implementation and interpretation of these regimes. In other words, 
legal disruption does not end with the creation of these regimes. These schemes give rise to 
new legal arrangements and novel legal questions, which will lead to legal uncertainty and 
thus legal disputes. Much of the legal disruption caused by these regimes is similar to that 
seen in the last two sections but a study of adjudication in relation to these regimes highlights 
the way in which legal disruption is not contained to one regulatory area, and how disruption 
also arises because of the way in which these regimes relate to other areas of law and in the 
implications of these regimes for private transactions.   
Many legal disputes generated by new climate change regimes are challenges to 
legislative, regulatory and administrative action under any particular scheme. These 
regulatory schemes, like all administrative law,137 will create new winners and losers and the 
latter will have an incentive to challenge regulatory action. Some of these challenges will be 
of a ‘macro’ nature, concerning the constitutionality or legality of climate regimes 
themselves. Thus the EU ETS has given rise to novel questions of EU law about the validity 
                                                            
134 Eg Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy 
efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 
2006/32/EC [2012] OJ L315/1. 
135 Eg Climate Change Act 2008 (UK) and California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006. 
136 ‘Flood Risk and Coastal Change’, http://planningguidance.planningportal.gov.uk/blog/guidance/flood-risk-
and-coastal-change/planning-and-flood-risk/ accessed 18 July 2016.  
137 Louis Jaffe, Judicial review of Administrative Action (Little Brown & Co 1965) 323. 
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of its scope,138 and about the respective competences of the Commission and Member 
States.139 In a different legal context, the Federal Court of Australia considered a number of 
constitutional challenges to laws banning vegetation clearance in Spencer v the 
Commonwealth.140 Other cases concern the operation of administrative discretion under a 
regime in a particular case and help to make sense of the relevant climate change regime on a 
case-by-case basis. Thus legal disputes may arise over what matters a decision took into 
account, the procedures they followed,141 or the purpose and nature of such regimes.142 There 
are challenges to whether the assessment of risk was valid, raising questions about the scope 
of review.143 Such administrative challenges become particularly legally disruptive when they 
concern regimes that are in state of legal evolution. It is in the nature of climate change-
related regimes to be in a state of flux, adjusting with the changing policy environment, but 
this gives rise to contested legal issues concerning their operation. Thus operators have 
challenged changes to green electricity schemes because they undermine their need for a 
‘secure and stable legal and investment environment’.144 Another case considered whether a 
policy change in relation to aviation emissions should be taken into account by a local 
planning authority.145 If such a change has been identified, this would then raise the issue of 
                                                            
138 C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America (n 130). See also Case C-425/13 Commission v Council 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:483. 
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140 [2015] FCA 754. 
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142 Eg Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change v Friends of the Earth [2012] EWCA Civ 28; Our 
Children's Earth Foundation v. California Air Resources Board 184 Cal Rptr 3d 365 (2015). 
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the legal obligation created by such a change.146 There are also issues relating to lawful 
compliance with climate change-related policies.147  
In adjudicating these cases relating to the administrative operation of climate change 
regimes, judges and other adjudicators are not only making sense of new, often changing 
regimes, but they are often challenged to reflect on the nature and scope of particular 
doctrines.  As with the cases discussed in Section Three, existing doctrine does not easily 
apply in relation to climate change regimes. In C-425/13 Commission v Council, the 
Advocate General noted that: 
This is the first time that the Court has been called upon to rule on the 
scope of the Council’s authority to lay down negotiating directives, in 
particular as regards the inclusion of procedural provisions, and on the 
role of the special committees designated by the Council in accordance 
with Article 218(4) TFEU, and it must do so in the context of the almost 
constant legal wrangle between the Council (and the Member States) and 
the Commission which has, since the outset, been a feature of the 
European Union’s emergence as a global player.148  
That question arose because of the perceived need for co-operation between different 
jurisdictions in relation to GHG emissions. In other words, the law was attempting to create 
frameworks to address the polycentric nature of climate change, which gave rise to new and 
disruptive legal questions.  
Climate change regimes also create new types of legal obligations and norms. The 
most dramatic examples of this can be seen with emissions trading schemes (ETSs). These 
                                                            
146 London Borough of Hillingdon (n 130). 
147 Newton v Great Lakes Council [2013] NSWLEC 1248 (merits review of development consent where the 
relevant Development Control Plan stated that ‘[a] linear sea level rise of 0.91m to the year 2100 is to be taken 
into account’). 
148 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, 17 March 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:174 [3]. 
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schemes reframe carbon emissions as something that can be divided into identifiable units 
that are then traded and sold on a ‘market’.149 Thus some litigation arising from the operation 
of ETSs involves determining the nature of these obligations and how they operate.150 The 
hard-edged language of the statutory obligation in section 1 of the UK Climate Change Act is 
another example of a novel type of legal obligation being created.151  
Beyond adjudication that seeks to understand new climate change regimes and to 
accommodate their novel obligations within the existing legal fabric, there is another layer of 
legal disruption generated by these kinds of regimes, as seen in disputes that raise questions 
about how they operate alongside, or in relation to, other legal regimes. Climate change 
regulatory regimes do not exist in a vacuum. In their operation in any legal culture, they are 
interacting with other legal frameworks and norms, and legal disputes arise about the nature 
of that interaction. Some issues may be relatively straightforward. For example, one 
contentious issue has been whether trading data from an ETS registry ‘environmental 
information’ for the purposes of the Environmental Information Directive.152 In Carbon 
Sequestration Council v Environmental Protection Agency,153 litigants unsuccessfully 
challenged the Agency’s rulemaking that supercritical carbon dioxide injected into wells for 
purposes of geologic sequestration was ‘solid waste’ under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act. By legally recognizing climate change, there are thus implications for a range 
of other regimes. 
                                                            
149 Sanja Bogojevic, ‘Ending the Honeymoon: Deconstructing Emissions Trading Discourses’ (2009) 21 JEL 
443. 
150 C-148/14 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Nordzucker AG, ECLI:EU:C:2015:287. 
151 See the obiter mention of this in Friends of the Earth, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for 
Energy & Climate Change [2009] EWCA Civ 810 (30 July 2009). 
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Other cases concern the types of general obligations that are created by general 
mitigation and emission reduction targets and which have legal effect in the context of other 
regimes.154 There are also cases concerning whether climate change-related strategies are 
legally relevant to planning decisions.155 Issues also arise concerning how different climate 
change obligations interact with each other.156 
There are other cases that concern how to reconcile the legal logic of climate change 
regimes with the legal logic of non-environmental law regimes. The most significant 
examples here are the free movement cases in EU law concerning national schemes that 
promote the use of ‘green electricity’ and their lawfulness under Art 34 TFEU. These 
schemes will invariably breach Article 34 TFEU, and will do so through the application of 
distinctly applicable measures (that is measures, that apply differently to situations in 
different Member States). However, in a number of decisions, the CJEU has justified such 
breaches on the basis of environmental protection – a justification only open to indistinctly 
applicable measures on conventional EU law doctrine.157 The reasoning in these cases does 
not simply involve exceptions to Article 34 TFEU case law – rather they require free 
movement lawyers to make sense of emerging doctrine, and to adapt their understanding of 
free movement law in light of it.158 Thus, for example, these cases might be understood as a 
form of ‘majoritarian’ reasoning where the Court is allowing Member States to justify a 
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a transport plan was consistent with state climate change mitigation and greenhouse gas reduction legislation).  
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breach of free movement of goods where they are pursuing a norm that is widely recognized 
as legitimate in the EU.159 
Finally, climate change regulatory regimes give rise to legally disruptive disputes 
between private parties who are transacting with each other in the shadow of climate change 
regulatory regimes.160 Many of these disputes are essentially private law disputes caused by 
the way in which climate change regulatory regimes disrupt existing legal practices. For 
example, targets created by energy efficiency schemes are not easily incorporated into day-
to-day practices in the commercial property sector, which is heavily dependent on pro forma 
leases.161 There are also legal disputes emerging over contractual interpretation,162 and cases 
involving ETS allowances being gained through fraud.163 There are also related tax 
disputes,164 and cases concerning breach of confidence in relation to the carbon market.165 
These cases flow from the novel types of legal obligations created by these regimes. As Low 
and Lin have highlighted in relation to one of these ETS cases, there is a need to identify in 
more detail the legal nature of allowances under the EU ETS.166 Legal disruption is thus 
occurring in evermore fine-grained detail as climate change regulatory regimes interact with 
existing norms, rights and understandings within particular legal cultures. 
5.  Resolving Climate Change Cases ‘Well’ 
                                                            
159 For this argument, see Fisher discussing Maduro’s ideas in Elizabeth fisher, Risk Regulation and 
Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart 2007) 216, 239. 
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You may be reading this and thinking that our argument about legal disruption is something 
of a non sequitur, or worse a form of scholarly sophistry. Law is always evolving, you are 
saying to yourself, and there will always be problems and technologies, whether they be 
railways or the internet, that disrupt the legal order.167 While we do not think that climate 
change is the only source of legal disruption, we do however think that it is distinctively 
disruptive and that it is important to identify and explore the legally disruptive nature of 
climate change for two reasons.  
 First, much of the discussion of climate change litigation has often cast it in an 
‘activist’ light and characterised it as a ‘pathway’ to dealing with climate change.168 There is 
value in this characterisation of climate change case law, but it does not expose the ways in 
which climate change inevitably gives rise to disruptive legal questions for courts and 
tribunals that need to be resolved, and the existential challenge for legal orders generated by 
this disruption. Courts must adjudicate when cases come before them and, in doing so, they 
must integrate climate change into the legal order.169  In some cases, the process of resolving 
a case may result in climate change not being legally recognised, but in many cases climate 
change issues are leading to an adaption of legal orders and legal reasoning.  
 Second, embedded in this reality is an important normative challenge – the need for 
courts and tribunals to resolve these disputes ‘well’ within their respective legal orders. 
Arguing that disputes need to be resolved ‘well’ begs many questions and we are deliberately 
highlighting the normative challenges for adjudication and for legal systems when faced with 
a disruptive phenomenon like climate change. The concept of resolving cases ‘well’ will 
                                                            
167 R Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825-1875 (Clarendon Press 1997) and Jonathan Zittrain, 
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168 Peel & Osofsky (n 3). 
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ultimately depend on the constitution and traditions of a particular legal culture and legal 
order, where such orders and cultures are a complex mass of ‘essentially contested’ 
concepts,170 but the overall normative challenges have universal features. The significance of 
exploring the normative impact of climate change disputes within legal systems is really the 
conclusion to our article. Whilst not wanting to curb the vigorous discussion and debate 
already underway in relation to adjudicative processes and climate change,171 there are two 
important issues that we see as useful to explore now that the legal disruption of climate 
change is an observable phenomenon – the nature of adjudication, and the nature of legal 
reasoning in stabilising legal orders.  
 In relation to the first issue, the cases above demonstrate that adjudication is playing a 
variety of roles in disputes involving climate change, ranging from resolving specific 
commercial disputes through to determining significant constitutional cases. In thinking 
about how to resolve these cases ‘well’, there is a need to recognise that adjudication can play 
different roles and is often playing these roles simultaneously.  
 There are two common ways of understanding adjudication – as form of dispute 
resolution and as a form of expository justice.172 The former is the most common way for 
lawyers to think about adjudication, but the latter has dominated much of the literature on 
climate change litigation. The important point to note is that any climate change case can be 
understood as being in line with either model (or with both models). Under the dispute 
resolution model, the primary function of adjudication is the resolution of disputes between 
parties through ‘the peculiar form of participation it affords to the affected party, that of 
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171 Eg Philippe Sands, ‘Climate Change and the Rule of Law: Adjudicating the Future in International Law’ 
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presenting proofs and arguments for a decision in his favour.’173 On this understanding, 
adjudication is commonly understood as applying to disputes between a limited number of 
identifiable parties in relation to specific legal problems, which lead to legal remedies. As we 
saw above, in some cases involving climate change, particularly in Section Two, the legal 
disruption caused by climate change does not sit easily with this model of adjudication. 
Questions of standing and justiciability are particularly challenged by the polycentric and 
normatively conflicted nature of climate change.  
But the legal disruption caused by climate change can also be understood in terms of 
an expository justice model of adjudication and has been understood in this way by many 
scholars. On this model, the role of judges is not simply to resolve disputes;174 they are also 
to ‘tell us how to conform our behaviour to our fundamental values.’175 It is less important 
that there are specific victims or claimants who require the resolution of a particular dispute, 
since adjudication is understood to concern norm setting and compliance, and with providing 
judgments or precedents for the community at large. Indeed, the community aspect of climate 
change adjudication explains the intense public (and partly the scholarly) interest in climate 
change cases, whether or not there is a publicly interested claimant involved. In expressing 
norms for a community, adjudication may be seen as a response to the failure of other 
institutions, such as a regulator failing to address climate change.176 Adjudication can also 
play a deeper set of roles,177 including holding valuable symbolic significance for a 
community, particularly in relation to a topic of social debate and conflict like climate 
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change. In particular, climate change adjudication ‘legitimizes concerns’178 over climate 
change by stating not only what the law is, but also what the facts are. The narrative of 
climate change litigation has been a narrative of making climate change ‘real’ within 
communities and case law has played an important role in that process, often irrespective of 
who ultimately ‘wins’ the case. As Jasanoff argues, litigation practices are ‘deeply 
institutionalized modes of achieving pragmatic closures around epistemic claims and 
controversies that science alone could not have settled’.179 Climate change adjudication is an 
arena in which an understanding of social and factual issues are co-produced and settled. In 
many ways, the expository justice model, and the wider symbolic function of adjudication 
within communities, fits more easily with the legal disruption caused by climate change, 
since polycentricity and socio-political conflict are less problematic on this understanding of 
climate change adjudication.   
These two different ideas of adjudication show that adjudication is of both individual 
and community importance and how quite different perspectives might be adopted on cases 
involving climate change, and in analysing whether those cases have been well resolved. 
However, whilst these models explain the multi-faceted nature of adjudication and help us to 
understand the responses of different actors and audiences to climate change cases, one 
model is not necessarily more correct than the other. The fact that the expository justice 
model accommodates better the kind of legal disruption generated by climate change (and 
thus has often been the focus of scholarship) does not mean it is the ‘right’ model of 
adjudication in a normative sense. Judicial decision-making in climate change cases cannot 
be evaluated or justified without a more fundamental appreciation of the role and limits of 
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adjudication within discrete legal systems. In other words, any consideration of resolving 
climate change cases ‘well’ requires reflection about these different roles of adjudication.  
The second significant issue in thinking about how to resolve climate change 
adjudication ‘well’ brings us back to the importance of legal reasoning in cases involving 
climate change and its role in maintaining the stability of legal systems in adjudicative 
processes. Climate change may present distinctive challenges for courts, but that does not 
mean the adjudicative function of courts or the development of doctrine should be seen as 
exceptional and apart from the rest of a legal system.180 Courts, in recognizing climate change 
and resolving related disputes, are incorporating climate change into the substructure of the 
law.  As noted at the outset, adjudication and judicial reasoning have a ‘homeostatic’ quality 
in which any argument must be integrated into the ‘the integrity of the legal edifice’.181 
Deciding climate change cases well requires confronting this basic function of adjudication 
through legal reasoning. As Lord Carnwath has noted:  
courts are uniquely placed to create the stable and legally enforceable 
structures necessary to ensure proper planning, supervision and 
enforcement. The courts cannot dictate policy. That is for 
government. But the courts can ensure that the policy is rational and 
coherent, and consistent with the scientific evidence, and that firm policy 
commitments are honoured.182 
Adjudication thus stabilises the legal disruption created by climate change by reconciling a 
particular dispute with well-established legal principles.183 This process encompasses a 
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variety of approaches to legal reasoning, depending on the legal issue and level of disruption 
involved. Thus some of the case law concerning climate change is ‘business as usual’,184 with 
courts carrying out their adjudicative duties – of applying the law to the facts, of applying 
doctrines to specific circumstances – in well-established ways to familiar types of parties in 
familiar types of disputes. Courts do not metamorphose into another type of institution by 
considering climate change issues. In other cases involving climate change, courts might 
make minimal adjustments to accommodate the disruptive features of climate change – 
involving a tweaking of legal regimes and small developments in legal doctrine. In other 
cases, the adjudicative process of accommodation is more significant. Thus the merits review 
decision of Bulga Milbrodale Progress Association Inc v Minister for Planning and 
Infrastructure and Warkworth Mining Limited185 is remarkable for the way in which Preston 
CJ developed decision-making principles on the basis that a decision needed to be 
polycentric.186 Climate change was only tangential to that case,187 but Preston CJ was 
recrafting doctrine to accommodate the legal heat of climate change.188 In other cases, the 
developments in doctrine are dramatic. This can be seen in relation to the Urgenda discussion 
in Section Three, and Warnock has noted that the decision is  
evidence of the courts ‘taking up the slack,’ shifting, and changing 
position as the context demands in order to restore the constitutional 
equilibrium, with the prospect of withdrawal when the need passes.189 
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At the same time, when courts or tribunals are performing this kind of stabilising 
function in reconciling the existing legal order and the disruption of climate change, there are 
limits to their role.  In particular, the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on relevant 
conventions of the constitutional and institutional competence of courts,190 the ‘integrity of 
the legal edifice’ constructed by judicial reasoning in a particular legal system, and the 
respect for courts within civil society.  In short, there is no simple or single answer as to 
whether a climate change case is well or poorly reasoned. Taking the legal implications of 
climate change seriously requires a deep and detailed understanding of legal systems and 
their doctrines, adjudicative processes and cultures. The challenge for courts and tribunals is 
to develop reasoning in climate change cases that is robust in the face of climate change and 
which also accommodates legal disputes relating to climate change within the legal order.  
The challenge for scholars and observers of courts is to understand the complexity of the 
adjudicative function in these cases, the inevitability of such disputes, and the subtle balance 
to be struck in adjudicating the future whilst maintaining the integrity of a legal order.    
6. Conclusion  
The increasing variety of cases concerning climate change demonstrates how climate change 
is universally disruptive of legal systems and how legal orders will often adapt and adjust in 
response to the disruption. Adjudicative forums are sites where the disruptive problem of 
climate change is finding legal form in a range of ways. In thinking about the relationship 
between climate change and adjudication, the focus cannot be on a specific law, set of rights, 
or legal regime. Carlarne has noted in relation to the UNFCCC: that ‘climate change is an 
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issue of such scale and complexity that it defies resolution through the constrained channels 
of an international environmental treaty’,191  
 The same is true of adjudication. Cases concerning climate change are now part of the 
reality of legal cultures across the world. These cases are not magic bullets to solve climate 
change – they are practical and symbolic judgments – and the fundamental legal issue is 
whether they are ‘good’ judgments and whether they are ‘worthy [of being] recognised’.192 In 
other words, lawyers, judges, and legal scholars are faced with existential questions about the 
nature of law and adjudication in dealing with climate change. In particular, as we argue, they 
must identify and articulate how to balance inevitable legal disruption and evolution in light 
of climate change issues with requirements for stability within legal systems. 
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